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1  Introduction 
 
As an example of situations to which the results of this paper can be applied we may 
consider the following story. There is a duopolistic industry in a developing country. The 
firms in the industry produce a homogeneous good. They can use a common new 
production technology which is more efficient than the present technology. The production 
cost with the new technology is lower than that with the present technology. This new 
technology is developed by a laboratory or a firm in a foreign developed country, and the 
government of the developed country wants to transfer the new technology to the 
developing country as a foreign aid free of charge. However, each firm in the developing 
country must expend some fixed set-up cost for education of its staff to adopt and use the 
new technology. 
This story is one example. The approach of this paper may be applied to other situations 
such as technology transfer between firms in one country, or between firms located in two 
developed countries. 
We consider a problem of subsidy or tax policy for new technology adoption of 
duopolistic firms under the assumption that each firm maximizes the weighted average of 
absolute and relative profits. The weight on the relative profit indicates the severity of 
competition. We examine the relationship between competitiveness and subsidy or tax 
policies for technology adoption 
This paper is based on our two-fold interests in analyses of duopolistic or oligopolistic 
industries. 
(1) The first is an interest in the relation between technology adoption and 
competitiveness under oligopoly. The important reference is Brander and Spencer (1983). 
They analyze strategic use of research and development, which takes place before the 
associated output is produced, by imperfectly competitive firms. They showed that such 
strategic use of R&D will increase the total amount of R&D undertaken, increase total 
output, and lower industry profit. Although the strategic use of R&D introduces 
inefficiency which means that total costs are not minimized for the output chosen, net 
welfare rises if products are homogeneous, marginal cost is nondecreasing, and demand is 
convex or linear. 
There are references about licensor’s strategic behavior, under duopoly or oligopoly such 
as Katz and Shapiro (1985), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Sen and Tauman (2007), La 
Manna  (1993), and under Stackelberg competition such as Filippini (2005), Kabiraj 
(2004), Wang and Yang (2004). Using cooperative game theory, Watanabe and Muto 
(2008) studies the equilibrium among licensor and licensees. Also, we introduce two papers 
concerning competitiveness. Boone (2001) analyzes the relation between licensor’s 
incentive to innovate and licensee’s competition, and has found the U-shaped relation. In 
Matsumura et. al. (2013), the relation between competitiveness, which is represented by the 
weight on the relative profit in maximization of the weighted average of absolute and 
relative profits as this paper, and endogenous R&D investments is analyzed. They showed 
that the R&D investment is U-shaped with respect to competitiveness like Boone (2001). 
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About social welfare and optimal policy, it has shown that optimal R&D investment is 
S-shaped with respect to competitiveness, and enhancement of competitiveness changes the 
optimal policy from taxation to subsidization . Their results and the results of this paper are 
similar, but the model in Matsumura et. al. (2013) is restricted to a symmetric equilibrium, 
and do not refer to fixed cost and the difference of cost functions. The model about 
technology adoption behavior where new technology is exogenously given as this paper is 
discussed in Zhang et. al. (2014) which focuses on the uncertainty of R&D investment, and 
Hattori and Tanaka (2014) which focuses on the relation between technology adoption and 
competitiveness using the relative profit maximization, but these do not analyze the social 
welfare. About social welfare, Pal (2010) shows that technology adoption may change the 
market outcome, and the social welfare is larger in Cournot competition than in Bertrand 
competition. The model in Pal (2010) and the model of this paper are similar. But in Pal 
(2010) government’s policies are not analyzed. Moreover, Elberfeld and Nti (2004) focuses 
on the spillover of new technology, and Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) focuses on the 
difference of cost functions, and these claim the over or under investment for the society in 
some situation. This paper extends Hattori and Y. Tanaka (2015) to a case of various 
competitiveness. 
Concerning empirical studies H. Tanaka (H. Tanaka (2004), (2013)) examined success 
factors of technology transfer from Japan to Taiwan (Republic of China) in post Word War 
2 period. He stressed the importance of social capability which reduces the technology 
transfer cost such as human capacity of bureaucracy and managers, and the role of the 
government for improvement of infrastructure, education and training of workers and 
engineers. Also, he claims that the government should choose the industry where foreign 
company can receive the tax benefit. And he concludes that these factors which promote 
technology transfer lead Taiwan to economic growth. 
(2) The second is an interest in the property of relative profit maximization, or 
maximization of weighted average of absolute and relative profits of firms. Theoretical 
justification of relative profit maximization is mainly based on evolutionary game theoretic 
point of view. Schaffer (1989) demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural 
selection that if firms have market power, profit-maximizers are not necessarily the best 
survivors. A unilateral deviation from Cournot equilibrium decreases the profit of the 
deviator, but decreases the other firm’s profit even more. On the condition of being better 
than other competitors, firms that deviate from Cournot equilibrium achieve higher payoffs 
than the payoffs they receive under Cournot equilibrium. He defines the finite population 
evolutionarily stable strategy (FPES). It is a strategy of a player that maximizes his relative 
payoff. And in Vega-Redondo(1997) it was shown that FPES is a strategy that survives in 
the long run equilibrium or stochastically stable state of a dynamic stochastically 
evolutionary game developed by Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993). Also 
Vega-Redondo(1997) showed that in a homogeneous good case if firms in an oligopoly 
maximize relative profits, a Walrasian equilibrium can be induced. 
We consider the following three-stage game in a duopoly with a homogeneous good.   
1.  The first stage: The government determines the level of lump-sum subsidies to or 
lump-sum taxes on the firms.  
2.  The second stage: The firms decide whether they adopt new technology or not.  
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3.  The third stage: The firms determine their outputs.  
The social welfare is defined to be consumers’ surplus plus firms’ profits. Lump-sum 
subsidies to the firms are financed by lump-sum taxes on the consumers, and revenues from 
taxes on the firms are transferred to the consumers in a lump-sum manner. These lump-sum 
taxes and transfers are not related to the good of this industry. Excluding income effects 
they do not affect demand for the good, and they are canceled out in the social welfare. 
We will show that when firm behavior is not competitive (the weight on the relative 
profit is small), the optimal policy of the government may be taxation; when firm behavior 
is competitive (the weight on the relative profit is large) but not extremely competitive 
(close to perfect competition), the optimal policy is subsidization or inaction and not 
taxation. The optimal policy may be taxation if the effect of new technology adoption by 
one firm on the social welfare is smaller than the effect on the objective function of a firm 
(the weighted average of absolute and relative profits). The reason why the optimal policy 
may be taxation when firms’ behavior is less competitive seems to be the fact that the social 
welfare includes the consumers’ surplus, and when the competitiveness is small, the 
volume of consumption is small. However, if firms’ behavior is extremely competitive 
(close to perfect competition), taxation case re-emerges. 
 
2  The model 
 
Two firms, Firm A and B, produce a homogeneous good, and consider adoption of new 
technology. Technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost. Denote 
the outputs of Firm A and B by Ax  and Bx , the price of the good by p . The utility 
function of consumers is  
 ,)(2
1)(= 2BABA xxxxau   
where a  is a positive constant. The inverse demand function is derived as follows.  
 .= BA xxap   
The cost functions of the firms before adoption of new technology are BAicxi ,=, , and 
the cost of each firm after adoption of new technology is zero. A fixed set-up cost is e . c  
and e  are positive constants and common to both firms. There exists no fixed cost other 
than the set-up cost. 
The social welfare W  is defined to be the sum of consumers’ surplus and firms’ profits 
as follows;  
 )]()()([)()(2
1)(= 2 BBAABABABABA xcxcxxpxxpxxxxaW   
 )()()(2
1)(= 2 BBAABABA xcxcxxxxa   
 )( AA xc  and )( BB xc  generally denote the cost functions of the firms. They may include 
set-up costs. We analyze the optimal subsidization or taxation policies of the government 
for adoption of new technology by firms when the firms seek to maximize the weighted 
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average of their absolute profits and relative profits. 
If adoption of new technology and non-adoption are indifferent for a firm, then it adopts 
new technology, and if adoption and non-adoption are indifferent for the society, the 
government chooses adoption. 
 
3  Competitiveness of firm behavior in imperfectly competitive 
market 
 
According to Matsumura and Matsushima(2012), Matsumura et. al. (2013), Shibata 
(2014) and Matsumura and Okamura (2015), we assume that each firm maximizes the 
weighted average of its absolute profit and relative profit. The relative profit of each firm is 
the difference between its absolute profit and the absolute profit of the rival firm. Let A  
and B  be the absolute profits of Firm A and B. Then, the objective functions of Firm A 
and B are defined to be  
   ,=)(1= BABAAA    
 and  
   .=)(1= ABABBB    
   is the weight on the relative profit. We assume 1<<1  . 
There are some literature which justifies maximization of relative profit or the weighted 
average of absolute and relative profits by firms, and as stated in the introduction there is 
justification of relative profit maximization based on evolutionary game theory. However, 
similarly to Matsumura and Matsushima(2012), Matsumura et. al. (2013) and Matsumura 
and Okamura (2015), we do not necessarily assume that firms really maximize the 
weighted average of their absolute and relative profits.   is interpreted as a parameter 
indicating the severity of competition. In a duopoly with a homogeneous good when   is 
near to 1, the equilibrium outcome is near to the equilibrium in a perfectly competitive 
market. When 0= , the model is reduced to the standard Cournot case. On the other hand, 
if   is near to 1 , each firm’s behavior is near to joint profit maximization, and thus, the 
outcome corresponds to that of collusion. Hence, 1,0)(  implies an intermediate 
competitiveness between monopoly and Cournot duopoly, and (0,1)  implies an 
intermediate competitiveness between Cournot duopoly and prefect competition. We 
assume that a  is sufficiently larger than c  and 
a
c21>   so that the equilibrium 
outputs of both firms when one firm adopts new technology are positive. 
 
4  Firm Behavior 
 
The values of the objective functions of the firms are as follows. Before adoption of new 
technology,  
 ],)[()(= BBBAAABAA cxxxxacxxxxa    
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 ].)[()(= AABABBBAB cxxxxacxxxxa    
After adoption of new technology by both firms,  
 ,)()(= exxxaexxxa BBAABAA    
 
 .)()(= exxxaexxxa ABABBAB    
After adoption of new technology by only Firm A,  
 ],)[()(= BBBAABAA cxxxxaexxxa    
 
 .)()(= exxxacxxxxa ABABBBAB    
After adoption of new technology by only Firm B,  
 ,)()(= exxxacxxxxa BBAAABAA    
 
 ].)[()(= AABABBAB cxxxxaexxxa    
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms. There are four cases.   
1.  The conditions for maximization of the objective functions of the firms when no 
firm adopts new technology are  
 0.=20,=2 ABABBA xcxxaxcxxa    
The equilibrium outputs, price and the equilibrium values of the objective functions of the 
firms are written as  
 .)(3
)()(1==,3
2)(1=,3== 2
22
00000




 



 cacapcaxx BABA  
 
2.  The conditions for maximization of the objective functions of the firms when both 
firms adopt new technology are  
 0.=20,=2 ABABBA xxxaxxxa    
The equilibrium outputs, price and the equilibrium values of the objective functions of the 
firms are written as  
 .)(1)(3
)(1=~=~,3
)(1=~,3=
~=~ 2
22
eaapaxx BABA 



 


  
 
3.  If only Firm A adopts new technology, the conditions for maximization of the 
objective functions of the firms are  
 0.=20,=2 cxxxaxxxa ABABBA    
The equilibrium outputs, price and the equilibrium values of the objective functions of the 
firms are written as  
 ,3
)(1=,))(1(3
2)(1=,))(1(3
)(1)(1= 










 capcaxcax AABAA  
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 ,))(3(1
)25(1)3(2))(1(1= 2
22322
ecacaAA 
 
  
 
 .))(3(1
)3(4)3)(4(1))(1(1= 2
22222
ecacaAB 
 
  
 
4.  If only Firm B adopts new technology, the equilibrium outputs, price and the 
equilibrium values of the objective functions of the firms are written as  
 ,3
)(1=,))(1(3
)(1)(1=,))(1(3
2)(1= 










 capcaxcax BBBBA  
 
 ,))(3(1
)3(4)3)(4(1))(1(1= 2
22222
ecacaBA 
 
  
 
 .))(3(1
)25(1)3(2))(1(1= 2
22322
ecacaBB 
 
  
 
 
Let define 0e  be the value of e  such that 0= AAA   or 0= BBB  , that is, adopting 
and non-adopting the new technology are indifferent for each firm when the rival firm does 
not adopt it. Then,  
 .))(3(1
)3](4)[(1= 2
2
0



 ccae  
Define 1e  be the value of e  such that BAA  =~  or ABB  =~ , that is, adopting and 
non-adopting the new technology are indifferent for each firm when the rival firm adopts it. 
Then,  
 .))(3(1
)3](4)[(1= 2
2
1



 ccae  
Clearly, since 1|<| , we have 10 > ee . If 0> ee  ( 0ee  ), the best response of a firm is 
non-adoption (adoption) of new technology when the other firm does not adopt. If 1> ee  
( 1ee  ), the best response of a firm is non-adoption (adoption) of new technology when the 
other firm adopts. Thus, the sub-game perfect equilibria of the game after the second stage 
are as follows.  
Lemma 1   
1.  If 1ee  , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms adopt new 
technology. In this case 1ee   and 0ee  , so adoption of new technology is the dominant 
strategy for both firms.  
2.  If 01 < eee  , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that one firm, Firm A 
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or B, adopts new technology. In this case 0ee   and 1> ee , so adoption of new 
technology is the best response to non-adoption, and non-adoption is the best response to 
adoption. 
3.  If 0> ee , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that no firm adopts new 
technology. In this case 0> ee  and 1> ee , so non-adoption is the dominant strategy for 
both firms.  
  
5  Social welfare 
 
In this section we consider the social welfare. When both firms adopt new technology, 
we write  
 ,2)(3
)2(2= 2
2
2 eaW 


  
when one firm adopts new technology, we write  
 ,))(32(1
)5(11))(1)(2(4= 2
2
1 eccaaW 


  
when no firm adopts new technology, we write  
 .)(3
))(2(2= 2
2
0



 caW  
Let define 0we  be the value of e  such that 01 = WW , that is, adopting and non-adopting 
the new technology by one firm are indifferent for the society when no firm adopts it. Then,  
 .))(32(1
]3)9(4))(1(2[4= 2
2
0



 ccaew  
Define 1we  be the value of e  such that 12 = WW , that is, adopting and non-adopting the 
new technology by one more firm are indifferent for the society when one firm adopts it. 
Then,  
 .))(32(1
]11)(5))(1(2[4= 21 


 ccaew  
If 0wee   ( 0> wee ), 01 WW   ( 01 < WW ); and if 1wee   ( 1> wee ), 12 WW   ( 12 < WW ). 
Comparing 0we  and 1we ,  
 0.>))(3(1
7)7(2= 2
22
10



 cee ww  
Thus, we get the following lemma.  
Lemma 2   
1.  If 1wee  , 2W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by both firms is 
optimal.  
2.  If 01 < ww eee  , 1W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by one firm 
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is optimal.  
3.  If 0> wee , 0W  is the maximum, and adoption of new technology by no firm is 
optimal.  
  
6  Subsidization or taxation policy 
 
6.1  Main results 
 
We know 10 > ww ee  and 10 > ee . Comparing 0we , 1we  with 0e  and 1e  yields 
 
 ,)2(3
]3)(2)(1[2= 211 


 ccaeew  
 
 ,))(32(1
]11)15(6))(1(1[2= 2
2
10



 ccaeew  
 
 ,))(32(1
]11)136(2))(1(1[2= 2
23
01



 ccaeew  
 
 .)2(3
]3)4(2)(1[2= 2
2
00



 ccaeew  
They may be positive or negative. However, 10 eew   is likely to be positive, and 01 eew   
is likely to be negative for reasonable values of variables. Suppose 2=10,= ca . Then,   
1.  If 0.9= ,  
 0.87.=0.24,=0.97,=0.14,= 00011011 eeeeeeee wwww   
 
2.  If 0.5= ,  
 1.28.=0.43,=1.87,=0.16,= 00011011 eeeeeeee wwww   
 
3.  If 0.1=  ,  
 0.48.=3.09,=2.68,=0.89,= 00011011 eeeeeeee wwww   
 
4.  If )210.5(>=
a
c ,  
 0.32.=7.51,=5.31,=1.88,= 00011011  eeeeeeee wwww  
 
Thus, the larger the value of  , that is, the larger the competitiveness is, the larger the 
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values of 11 eew   and 00 eew   are. However, if   is extremely large (close to perfect 
competition), 11 eew   is small again. We consider the following three cases.   
1.  Case A (  is large): 1100 >>> eeee ww .  
2.  Case B (  is a bit small, or   is extremely large) : 1100 > ww eeee  .  
3.  Case C (  is very small): 1100 >>> ww eeee .  
Then, we obtain the following results.  
 
Theorem 1 The optimal policies should be as follows;   
1.  Case A:   
(a) If 0> wee , the government should do nothing.  
(b) If 00 < weee  , the government should give subsidies to the firms. The level of the 
subsidy to each firm must not be smaller than 0ee   and must be smaller than 1ee  . 
Only one firm actually receives a subsidy and adopts new technology.  
(c) If 01 < eeew  , the government should do nothing.  
(d) If 11 < weee  , the government should give subsidies to both firms. The level of the 
subsidy to each firm must not be smaller than 1ee  .  
(e) If 1ee  , the government should do nothing.  
  
2.  Case B:   
(a) If 0> wee , the government should do nothing. The same result as (1) of 1.  
(b) If 00 < weee  , the government should give subsidies to the firms. The same result as 
(2) of 1.  
(c) If 01 < eee  , the government should do nothing. The same result as (3) of 1.  
(d) If 11 < eeew  , the government should impose taxes on the firms. The level of the tax on 
each firm must be larger than ee 1 , and must not be larger than ee 0 . With this tax 
scheme only one firm pays the tax and adopts new technology.  
(e) If 1wee  , the government should do nothing. The same result as (5) of 1.  
  
3.  Case C:   
(a) If 0> ee , the government should do nothing. The same result as (1) of 1 and 2.  
(b) If 00 < eeew  , the government should impose taxes on the firms. The level of the tax 
on each firm must be larger than ee 0 .  
(c) If 01 < weee  , the government should do nothing. The same result as (3) of 1 and 2.  
(d) If 11 < eeew  , the government should impose taxes on the firms. The same result as 
(4) of 2.  
(e) If 1wee  , the government should do nothing. The same result as (5) of 1 and 2.  
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Proof.   
1.  Case A:   
(a) In this case 0W  is optimal and no firm adopts new technology without subsidy nor 
tax. Thus, the government should do nothing.  
(b) In this case 1W  is optimal but no firm adopts new technology without subsidy nor 
tax. The government should give subsidies to the firms. The level of the subsidy to each 
firm must not be smaller than 0ee   and must be smaller than 1ee  . With this subsidy 
scheme only one firm actually receives a subsidy and adopts new technology at the 
equilibrium.  
(c) In this case 1W  is optimal and only one firm adopts new technology without subsidy 
nor tax. The government should do nothing.  
(d) In this case 2W  is optimal but only one firm adopts new technology without subsidy 
nor tax. The government should give subsidies to both firms. The level of the subsidy to 
each firm must not be smaller than 1ee  . If a subsidy is given to only one firm, the other 
firm does not adopt.  
(e) In this case 2W  is optimal and both firms adopt new technology without subsidy nor 
tax. Thus, the government should do nothing.  
  
2.  Case B:   
 
(a) In this case 1W  is optimal but both firms adopt new technology. Thus, the 
government should impose taxes on the firms. The level of the tax on each firm must be 
larger than ee 1 , and must not be larger than ee 0 . With this tax scheme only one firm 
pays the tax and adopts new technology.  
 
3.  Case C:    
 (a) In this case 0W  is optimal, but one firm adopts new technology. Thus, the 
government should impose taxes on the firms. The level of the tax on each firm must be 
larger than ee 0 . 
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Figure  1: Relations among competitiveness, set-up cost and optimal policies 
   
6.2  Example 
 
Let us consider an example. Assume 10=a  and 2=c . Then, the values of 0e , 1e , 
0
we  and 1we  are  
 ,1)()(3
4)34)(4(5=,1)()(3
4)35)(4(4= 2
2
1
2
2
0







 ee  
  
 .1)()(3
504058=,1)()(3
223286= 2
2
1
2
2
0








ww ee  
 
Case A, B and C are obtained as follows. 
  
1.  Case A: If 0.845)(10
66<<0.355)(10
66   , 1100 >>> eeee ww .  
2.  Case B: If 10
660.343)(8
333    or 10
66  , 1100 > ww eeee  .  
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3.  Case C: If 8
333<  , 1100 >>> ww eeee .  
 
The relationships among the competitiveness (the value of  ), the value of e  and the 
types of optimal policies, subsidization, taxation or inaction (doing nothing) are depicted in 
Figure 1. S , T  and N  denotes the domains of the values of   and e  in which the 
optimal policies are, respectively, subsidization, taxation and inaction. In Figure 2 we 
depict the relation between the competitiveness and the (minimum) level of subsidy or tax 
in the case where 8.6=e . The positive value means a subsidy, and the negative value 
means a tax. In Figure 3 we depict the case where 6.5=e . In this case the government 
never gives a subsidy. In this figure there is a discontinuity of the curve because the optimal 
number of new technology adopting firm changes from one to two, but both firms adopt 
new technology without subsidy nor tax across 0.01646 . 
 
 
6.3  Some discussions 
 
  
Figure  2: Relation between competitiveness and the level of subsidy or tax: 8.6=e  
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Figure  3: Relation between competitiveness and the level of subsidy or tax: 6.5=e  
   
The effects of the competitiveness expressed by the value of   on the government’s 
subsidy or tax policy are decomposed as follows.   
1.  A subsidy encourages technology adoption, which tends to increase social welfare 
because of the production increase and cost reduction.  
2.  While social welfare cares about the profits of two firms, each firm maximizes its 
own profit minus a fraction   of its competitor’s profit. Therefore, each firm’s decision 
making has a negative externality on its competitor, and profits can be too small relative to 
the social optimal. Hence, the government may charge a tax so that profits may go up.  
 
We discuss about our results in some detail. In Case A at the equilibria the 
government give subsidies to the firms or does nothing. There is no equilibrium with taxes. 
In Case B there are equilibria with taxes and equilibria with subsidies. In Case C at the 
equilibria the government impose taxes on the firms or does nothing. There is no 
equilibrium with subsidies. The difference between 0we  and 0e  and the difference 
between 1we  and 1e  are important for the pattern of the optimal policy, subsidization or 
taxation. 0we  ( 1we ) represents the effect of new technology adoption by one firm on the 
social welfare when no firm (one firm) adopts, and 0e  ( 1e ) represents the effect on the 
weighted average of absolute and relative profits of the adopting firm when the other firm 
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does not adopt (adopts). The optimal policy may be taxation if 00 < eew  or 11 < eew . When 
the value of   is large (not extremely large), 00 > eew  ( 11 > eew ), and the smaller the value 
of   is, the smaller the value of 00 eew   ( 11 eew  ) is. The reason why the optimal policy 
may be taxation when   is small seems to be the following fact.  
 The social welfare is the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the profits of the firms. When 
the competitiveness is small (  is small), the outputs of the firms and the volume of 
consumption are small, and so the effect of new technology adoption by one firm on the 
social welfare is small relatively to the effect on the objective functions of the firms.  
 
However, if firm behavior is extremely competitive (close to perfect competition), 
taxation case re-emerges because 11 > wee . The reason may be the following fact.  
 If the competitiveness is very large, the objective function of a non-adopting firm (a firm 
which does not adopt new technology) when the other firms adopts is negative with large 
absolute value, and so the effect of new technology adoption by that firm ( 1e ) is large4.  
 
7  Ongoing and future researches 
 
We are proceeding research in two directions. The first is the extension of the results in 
this paper to a case of oligopoly. The second is the studies of strategies by firms and public 
policies around licensing problem. In this paper we consider free technology transfer and 
fixed set-up cost. New technology developed by an innovating firm spreads to other firms 
in a domestic or a foreign country by licensing as well as free transfer. We are studying 
choice of strategies by an innovating firm, to license its new technology to other firms 
without entering the market, or to license its technology at the same time enter the market, 
or to enter the market without license.  
Further, there exist some valuable future research themes, for example, spillover effect 
(d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), Shibata (2014)), initial asymmetries between firms 
(Lahiri and Ono (1999), Kitahara and Matsumura (2006)), uncertainty (Matsumura (2003), 
Kitahara and Matsumura (2006)) and patent race (O'Donoghue (1998), Ishibashi and 
Matsumura (2006)). 
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